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RICE v. PALADIN: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S 
UNNECESSARY LIMITING OF A PUBllSHER'S FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold entered Col-
umbine High School in Littleton, Colorado and killed twelve fellow 
students and a teacher; wounded several others; then turned their 
guns on themselves, committing suicide. 1 These two had an arsenal 
of weapons, including at least one hundred homemade bombs,2 sev-
enty-six of which they planted in the high schooP Thirty of the sev-
enty-six bombs detonated.4 
Harris and Klebold obtained instructions to make many of 
these explosives from the Internet.s One of the perpetrators, Eric 
Harris, published pipe-bomb assembly instructions on his personal 
Web page, which also featured links to other, similar websites.6 
Publications providing instructions on how to perform criminal 
acts have been available to Americans for many years.7 A 1997 De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) report revealed that publications provid-
ing bomlrmaking instructions are "readily available to any member 
of the public interested in reading them and copying their con-
1. See Angie Cannon et aI., Why?, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REpORT, May 3, 1999, at 16-
17. 
2. See id. 
3. See Gary Massaro et aI., Report Sheds Light on Tragedy Swat Team Found Saunders 
Alive, But Paramedics Arrived Too Late, DENVER RocKY MTN. NEWS, May 15, 2000, 
at 4A. The teenagers left the remaining thirteen bombs in their cars parked 
outside of the school. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See Kevin McCoy, Internet Targeted in Probe, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 1999, at 
34. 
6. See id. "Harris ... apparently bragged about the ease of building pipe bombs 
in a file on his America Online Web site .... " Id. "The site included instruc-
tions on attaching shrapnel to a bomb, as well as the type and amount of ex-
plosive powder needed." Id. 
7. See also REx FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
TORS (Paladin Press) (1983) (killing for hire); J. FLORES, How TO MAKE A DIS-
POSABLE SILENCER, (VOL. II): A COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE (Paladin Press) 
(1983) (crafting a disposable silencer); WILLlAM L. PIERCE, THE TURNER DIARIES 
(Barricade Books) (1978) (creating a bomb). 
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tents."8 With a few strokes on a computer keyboard, one can have 
such a publication almost instantaneously.9 In the 1997 report, the 
001 stated: 
It is readily apparent from our cursory examination that an-
yone interested in manufacturing a bomb, dangerous 
weapon or weapon of mass destruction can easily obtain de-
8. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REpORT ON THE AVAIlABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMA-
TION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAw, 
AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAy BE SUBJECT TO REGULA-
TION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION, April, 1997, at 5, available at <http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/ 
speech/bomb.html#pubavail> [hereinafter BOMB MAKING]. A member of the 
DOJ Committee found titles to over 110 different bomb-making texts listed on 
a website, such as "How To MAKE A C02 BOMB," "JUG BOMB," "CHERRY 
BOMB," "MAIL GRENADE," "CALCIUM CARBIDE BOMB," and "CHEMICAL FIRE BOT-
TLE." These titles could be readily printed or copied. See id. at 7. See also, Ger-
ald Mizejewski, 21 Pipe Bombs Found in Boy s Toy Box Detonation Prompted Search 
of Apartment, Sept. 6, 2000 WASH. TIMES (D.C.) at Cl, available at 2000 WL 
4164186 (quoting A.T.F. Agent Mike Campbell: "With the advent of the In-
ternet and published books [about bombs], the instructions are readily availa-
ble ... [and] not difficult devices.to construct and make work"); Amitai Et-
zioni, Is Information on How to Make a Bomb More Harmful than Porn?, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 1995 at 31 (discussing numerous how-to crime books availa-
ble by mail order including: BE YOUR OWN UNDERTAKER: How TO DISPOSE OF A 
DEAD BODY, DEADLY BREW: ADVANCED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVES, THE ANCIENT ART 
OF STRANGULATION, THE POOR MAN's SNIPER RiFLE, 21 TECHNIQUES OF SILENT 
KiLLING, THE HOME AND RECREATIONAL USE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES, KiLL WITHOUT 
JOY: THE COMPLETE HOW-To-KiLL BooK, GUERRILLA'S ARSENAL: ADVANCED TECH-
NIQUES FOR MAKING EXPLOSIVES AND TIME-DELAY BOMBS, ULTIMATE SNIPER, THE 
BIG BOOK OF MISCHIEF, SILENT BUT DEADLY: MORE HOMEMADE SILENCERS FROM 
HAYDUKE THE MAsTER, How TO BUILD PRACTICAL FIREARM SUPPRESSORS: AN IL-
LUSTRATED STEP-By-STEP GUIDE, and THE TERRORIST HANDBOOK); WILLIAM L. 
PIERCE, THE TURNER DIARIES (Barricade Books 1978). The Turner Diaries, written 
by the leader of the National Alliance, a white supremacist group in West Vir-
ginia, and another "how to" book published by Paladin was found in Timothy 
McVeigh's possession when he was arrested for the April 19, 1995 bombing of 
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. See 
Doreen Carvajal, Group Tries to Halt Selling of Racist Nove~ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
1996, § 1, at 8. 
9. See Carvajal, supra note 8, § 1, at 8; see also http://www.totse.com/files/FA031/ 
draino.htm (visited Sept. 26, 2000) (draino bomb); http://www.totse.com/ 
files/FA031/pipebomb.htm (visited Sept. 26, 2000) (pipe bomb); http://mem-
bers.aol.com/ eukaryote/SciHumor /bomb.html (visited Sept. 26, 2000) 
(atomic bomb); see Cheryl White, My Son Built a Bomb, LADIES HOME]', Mar. 1, 
1997, at 36 (discussing a son's injuries resulting from attempting to detonate a 
bomb built from information obtained from the Internet). 
2000] Rice v. Paladin 
tailed instructions for fabricating and using such a device. 
Available sources include not only publications from the so-
called underground press but also manuals written for legit-
imate purposes, such as military, agricultural, industrial and 
engineering purposes. Such information is also readily avail-
able to anyone with access to a home computer equipped 
with a modem. 10 
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There is little doubt that, had Harris and Klebold not taken 
their own lives, they would, at a minimum, have been incarcerated 
for life; however, some believe that the publishers of these how-to 
materials are partially responsible for the teenagers' actions.u 
Would this tragedy been avoided had these instructions not been 
available? . 
The events at Columbine High School provoke consideration 
of whether, by publishing information on how to commit a crime, 
the publisher becomes criminally responsible for assisting a reader 
who uses that information to commit a crime. However, to impose 
criminal responsibility without proper consideration to the protec-
tions afforded by the United States Constitution eviscerates both the 
protections necessary to maintain a free society, and the personal 
responsibility of the actual offenders. Some believe this information 
is not protected by the First Amendment because publishers are as-
sisting in criminal conduct. 12 Others believe such a publication IS 
10. Id. at 9. 
11. Lonn Weissblum, Comment, Incitement to Violence on the World Wide Web: Can 
Publishers Seek First Amendment Refuge?, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 35, 
57-58 (2000). 
12. See STANLEY FISH. THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GoOD 
THING. Too 102 (1994) ("Nowadays the First Amendment is the First Refuge 
of Scoundrels" (quoting S. Johnson & S. Fish»; S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy 
& Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Be-
yond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1159. 1168 (2000) ("The contempo-
rary First Amendment speech categories do not address adequately the social 
costs associated with speech intended to facilitate antisocial behavior."); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7 
(1986) ("[TJhe suggestion that the first amendment ties our hands in dealing 
with ... revolutionaries ... is an unintended intimation of that most fright-
ening of constitutional conceptions: the Constitution as a suicide pact."). Ac-
cord Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-52 (1985) (arguing that context is an important ele-
ment of contemporary First Amendment analysis); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE LJ. 
1411, 1424, 1438 (1995) (positing that consideration of context is essential to 
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protected by the First Amendment and should be scrutinized to de-
termine whether there is a direct government interest advanced in 
suppressing the publication, and whether that interest is legitimate, 
substantial, or compelling enough to justify its suppression.13 
The First Amendment of the Constitution affords United States 
residents the rights to speak and print free of government prohibi-
tion. 14 Although the right to free speech in the United States is well-
established, this freedom risks encroachment based on the notion 
that harmful ideas and words result in harmful acts.15 
In the landmark case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,16 the Supreme 
Court developed a test to separate political speech and abstract ad-
vocacy, both protected by the First Amendment, from speech advo-
cating illegal conduct, which is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment. 17 Many cases' involving media publications that reportedly 
incite illegal and harmful acts have been scrutinized under the 
Brandenburg doctrine.1s Although this test does not always provide 
defendants with the most desirable outcome, the application of the 
test, alone, signifies the First Amendment protection and recogni-
tion of publication as a form of speech. 
In recent years, most courts have ruled that "how-to" publica-
tions, similar to the bomb-making materials Harris and Klebold ac-
cessed, are not entitled to First Amendment scrutiny, failing to rec-
ognize them as a protected form of speech.19 Most of these cases 
proper application of the First Amendment properly); see also DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, BOMB MAKING 26 (1997) available at <http://www.usdog.gov/criminal/ 
cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.htmi> ("[W]here it is foreseeable that the publi-
cation will be used for criminal purposes . . . the Brandenburg requirement 
that the facilitated crime be imminent should be of little, if any, relevance."). 
13. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Protection of Commercial Speech Under First Amend-
ment-Suprtmze Court Cases, 164 AL.R FED. 1, § 14-16 (2000). 
14. See infra note 26 and accompanying text for the language of the First Amend-
ment. 
15. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1322 
(1992) (" [E]xisting understandings of the First Amendment presuppose that 
legal toleration of speech-related harm is the currency with which we as a so-
ciety pay for First Amendment protection."); see also infra Pan V. 
16. 395 U.S. 444. 
17. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; infra Part II.E for a thorough discussion of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 
18. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text, Part III. 
19. Compare Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding 
First Amendment does not apply to book providing explicit instructions to 
commit murder); National Org. for Women V. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 
656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("That 'aiding and abetting' of an illegal act may be car-
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preclude using the First Amendment as a defense to those who pro-
vide instructions on how to accomplish a crime, holding that, al-
though information relaying illegal instructions is a form of speech, 
it is not protected by the First Amendment because it assists in com-
mitting a crime.20 
Recently, in Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc.21 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment 
posed no bar to imposing civil liability against the publisher, after 
the defendant, James Perry, was contracted to murder three individ-
uals after reading murder for hire. how-to books.22 The court re-
fused to recognize the content of the books as a protected form of 
speech, afforded the publisher no First Amendment protection, and 
found that the publisher may be civilly liable for aiding and abet-
ting the murders by publishing the books.23 
ried out through speech is no bar to its illegality."); United States v. Rowlee, 
899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no First Amendment issue for defendarIt 
instructor who sold tax forms to justify fraudulent claims and provided tax ad-
vice for all of the members on how to evade taxes); United States v. Mendel-
sohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 1990) (precluding First Amendment de-
fense where speech in computer software instructions is closely intertwined 
with a criminal act); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(convicting defendarIt for aiding and abetting individuals in manufacture of 
phencyclidine (PCP) after defendant provided instructions in High Times mag-
azine); United States v. VararIi, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[S]peech is 
not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime 
itself.") with Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(ruling for defendarIt after applying the Brandenburg test where young boy fol-
lowed instructions for auto-erotic asphyxia and consequently suffocated de-
spite publisher's explicit and numerous warnings). 
20. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 248 ("[T]he First Amendment poses no bar to the imposi-
tion of civil (or criminal) liability for speech acts which the plaintiff (or the 
prosecution) can establish were undertaken with specific, if not criminal, in-
tent.") (citations omitted); Rowiee, 899 F.2d at 1278, 1280 ("Having under-
taken to charge on the First Amendment, the district court correctly in-
structed the jury that, if the defendants [conspired to defraud the IRS] 
the First Amendment afforded no defense."). 
21. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
22. See id. at 242. The books were HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin Press) (1983) (hereinafter "HIT MAN") and How 
TO MAKE A DISPOSABLE SILENCER, (VOL. II): A COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE 
(hereinafter "DISPOSABLE SILENCER"). See id. at 238 (HIT MAN), 241 (DISPOSABLE 
SILENCER). 
23. See id. at 267. The Fourth Circuit's holding Was reinforced when the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari to hear the case. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 523 
U.S. 1074 (1998). See also infra Part IV for a complete discussion of Rice v. 
Paladin Enters., Inc. 
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Although the outcome may have be the same, the Brandenburg 
doctrine should have been applied to the Rice case.24 By refusing to 
provide the publisher of Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent 
Contractors with First Amendment protection, publishers must now 
be concerned with the possible effect and liability of the content of 
texts submitted for publication.25 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances. "26 This right is firmly en-
trenched into our system of government. 27 Some consider it the 
most valuable freedom, as Justice Holmes illustrated: 
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many a 
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
24. See infra Part II.E, IV & V exploring the Brandenburg doctrine, its rationale, 
application and purpose; the speech act doctrine, its rationale for this First 
Amendment exception; and why the doctrine should be applied to cases such 
as Rice. 
25. See infra Part V discussing Rice v. Paladin and its implications for the future. 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27. Since the early days of the American Revolution, individual parties and the 
courts have shaped First Amendment legal analysis. For example, Thomas 
"Jefferson once remarked that he did not care whether his neighbor said that 
there are twenty gods or no God, because 'it neither picks my pocket nor 
breaks my leg.'" Leonard Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, 68 
AM. HIST. REv. 22, 22 (1962). Likewise; 
In 1789 William Cushing, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, wrote a 
long letter to John Adams discussing the press clause in the Massa-
chusetts Constitution. Cushing asserted the importance of a free 
press to good government and stressed the crucial role the American 
press played in resisting British authority and supporting the Revolu-
tion. He claimed that the clause covered subsequent as well as previ-
ous restraints, and . .. advocated truth as a defense against prose-
cutions for seditious libel. Adams, who had drafted this clause, 
essentially agreed with Cushing. 
David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795, 812 (1985). 
2000] . Rice v. Paladin 
market, and the truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes can safely be carried out.28 
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This "market place of ideas" philosophy is founded upon the no-
tions that all ideas are worth advocating in the market place of free 
speech, and that faith in the idea is truly tested within this market 
place.29 
The boundaries of this marketplace continue to be defined 
through judicial determinations.30 Such boundaries occurred with 
the Supreme Court's recognition of the government's interest in 
protecting people. The Court established five categories of speech 
that are not afforded First Amendment protection, namely: (1) ob-
scenity,31 (2) fighting words,32 (3) libel,33 (4) commercial speech,34 
and (5) words likely to incite imminent lawless action.35 
A. Obscenity 
The Supreme Court excluded the first category of unprotected 
speech, obscenity, in Miller v. California.36 In Miller, the defendant 
was criminally charged under California law for conducting a mass 
28. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, j., dissenting). 
29. See Edward j. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present Danger" 
Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1118, 113944 (1990); Christo-
pher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Mametplace of Ideas, 19 u.c. DAVIS L. REv. 669, 
669-72 (1986). 
30. Compare Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996) with Rice 
v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
31. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
32. See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
33. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964). 
34. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
35. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969). This Comment fo-
cuses on the fifth category-words that incite imminent lawless action, also 
known as the speech act. However, to appreciate this exception it is important 
to understand the first four unprotected areas of speech. 
36. 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (reaffirming Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-
85 (1957»; see also Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-77 (1977) (finding an Il-
linois statute conforms with the test set fourth for obscenity and affirming 
defendant's conviction for selling sadomasochistic publications); Pendleton v. 
California, 423 U.S. 1068, 1068 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging the 
Court to analyze the allegedly obscene material under the second and third 
prongs of Miller before convicting the defendant); J-R Distribs., Inc. v. Wash-
ington, 418 U.S. 949, 949-53 (1974) (striking back at Justice Brennan's thir-
teen dissents to the Supreme Court's decisions to deny certiorari and balanc-
ing the right of consenting adults to obtain obscenity with the right of the 
states to prohibit the distribution of obscenity). 
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mailing of unsolicited brochures advertising adult books around the 
state.37 These brochures depicted men and women engaged in sexu-
ally explicit activities.38 Two individuals, offended by the brochures, 
brought the mailing to the police.39 The appellant, Marvin Miller, 
argued that the California statute under which he was charged was 
overbroad and encroached on his freedom of expression.4O 
The Court struck a balance between the appellant'S freedom of 
expression and the State's interest in protecting its residents from 
offensive, unsolicited materials41 by creating parameters within 
which members of the community were to determine whether the 
brochure was obscene.42 The Court enumerated the following 
guidelines: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ... (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.43 
If the material under consideration met these criteria, then it was 
obscene and lacked First Amendment protection.44 The policy be-
hind this exception to free speech was to protect children and un-
consenting adults from exposure to vulgar material.45 
37. See id. at 16, 18. 
38. See id. at 18. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. at 25. 
41. Compare id. at 23-24 (discussing appellant's right to free expression) with id. at 
18-19 (discussing the state's interests in regulating obscene material). 
42. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court remanded the case to be determined, 
consistent with the standard enumerated in its opinion. See id. at 37. 
43. [d. at 24. For additional commentary about the Supreme Court's definition of 
obscenity and of community standards, see, e.g., Joseph T. Clark, The "Commu-
nity Standard" in the Trial of Obscenity Cases-A Mandate for Empirical Evidence in 
Search of the Truth, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 13, 14-16 (1993); Anne Salzman, On 
the Offensive: Protecting Visual Art With Sexual Content Under the First Amendment 
and the "Less Valuable Speech" Label 55 U. PUT. L. REv. 1215, 122943 (1994); 
Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the Limits of the First 
Amendment 66 TENN. L. REv. 597, 615-36 (1999). 
44. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24. 
45. [d. at 27. 
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B. Fighting Words 
The second category of unprotected speech, "fighting words," 
was created in Chaplisky v. New Hampshire.46 The Supreme Court de-
fined fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. "47 This 
seminal case arose after a Jehovah's Witness standing near the en-
trance to a city hall building in Rochester, New York yelled: " '[y] ou 
are a God damned rackateer' and 'a damned facist and the whole 
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists'" to an 
unnamed religious individual.48 
The Court held that those words were not protected by the 
First Amendment given their propensity to incite others to react via-
lently.49 Elaborating, the Court explained that the effect of the 
words was not based on what the hearer thinks, but what "men of 
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to 
cause an average addressee to fight . . . . "50 Because the appellant 
breached the peace and shouted fighting words, the First Amend-
ment did not protect his speech, and the Court upheld his 
conviction.51 
46. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Court justified restraining orders for picketers 
outside abortion clinics because the picketer'S speech constituted fighting 
words. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 
374-85 (1997); Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 
1133, 1135-39 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the 
Workplace: Harassment or Protected SPeech? 22 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 959 (1999) 
(relating religious speech to speech that incites people to become enraged, 
and balancing religious speech as fighting words with the right to freedom of 
religion); J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 
2295 (1999) (discussing the similarities between sexual harassment and fight-
ing words). 
48. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
49. See id. 
50. Id. at 573. 
51. See id. at 574. In affirming the conviction, the Court stated: 
Id. 
Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts dis-
closed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the 
privilege of free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate 
that the appellations "damned racketeer" and "damned facist" are 
epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and 
thereby cause a breach of the peace. 
, 
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C. Libel 
Libel, a publication made with actual malice52 that is "injurious 
to the reputation of another, "53 is the third category of unprotected 
speech.54 In New York Times v. Sullivan,55 the respondent, L.B. Sulli-
van, an elected commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, sued the 
New York Times for printing libelous statements about him in a full-
page advertisement.56 Although never identified by name, Sullivan 
alleged that any reader would know he was being mocked in the ad-
vertisement given its contents and his position in the community.57 
The New York Times sought refuge in the security of the First 
Amendment.58 Addressing this argument, the Court stated: "libel 
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It 
must be measured with standards that satisfy the First Amend-
ment. "59 Considering the case in this light, the Court found that the 
nature of the advertisement-an "expression of grievance and pro-
test on one of the major public issues of our time"60-"would seem 
to clearly qualify for the constitutional protection. "61 First Amend-
ment protection did not depend on whether the statements made 
were true,62 nor defamatory;63 however, those statements made with 
actual malice-"knowledge that [the statements were] false or with 
reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not"64-were not 
protected.65 The Court found that although negligent, the newspa-
per did not act with actual malice; therefore, publication of the ad-
vertisement was protected.66 
52. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
53. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed. 1990). 
54. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For an overview and re-
cent analysis of libel, see Robert D. Sack, Protection of opinion Under the First 
Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, "Defamation and Privacy Under the First 
Amendment," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (2000). 
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
56. See id. at 256. 
57. See id. at 258. 
58. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 271. 
63. See id. at 273. 
64. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. 
65. See id. 
66. See id; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1,21-23 (1990) ("[WJhere 
a statement of 'opinion' on a matter of public concern reasonably implies 
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D. Commercial Speech 
The fourth category, commercial speech, speech that advertises 
a business purpose,67 is afforded limited protection by the First 
Amendment because it is coercive and holds a "subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values .... "68 As such, the Su-
preme Court determined that the level of judicial scrutiny was lower 
in order to protect the public from it.69 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass 'n,70 the Supreme Court discussed the interplay between free 
false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those individu-
als must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their false 
implications or with reckless disregard of their truth."); Harte-Hanks Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1989) (explaining that 
where a public figure brings suit, the public figure must show actual malice 
under the New York Times standard for libel); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 48-57 (1988) (holding that a nationally known minister could not win 
a suit for libel against a magazine that parodied the minister without showing 
actual malice on the part of the magazine); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345-
46 (1974) (determining actual malice includes consideration of the status of 
the individual being defamed as a public or private figure, resulting in imposi-
tion of liability on a newspaper publisher who printed false information that 
private individual was a communist); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 
485 A.2d 374, 387 (Pa. 1984) (establishing the burden on the appellant to 
prove the truth of defamatory statements does not violate the First Amend-
ment). The New York Times' victory is also attributed to the overbreadth doc-
trine under which the Court declared the Alabama statute at issue in the. case 
unconstitutional. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 291-92. 
67. BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 271 (6th ed. 1990). 
68. See Ohralik v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978) ("Unlike a public advertise-
ment, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act 
upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands 
an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or 
reflection."). For a more complete discussion regarding commercial speech, 
see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitu-
tional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1999). 
69. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. 
United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930-36 (1999) (determining whether a Federal 
Communications Commission regulation advances a government interest and 
can preclude certain commercial speech); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elli-
ott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 468-504 (discussing "whether being compelled to fund 
this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is 
simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to re-
solve" and holding that the advertising program does not violate the First 
Amendment); Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-35 (1995) (dis-
tinguishing between free speech and commercial speech, and holding that at-
torney advertising is not afforded unlimited freedom of speech). 
70. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
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speech and the ability of the States to regulate commercial activity.71 
Ohralik originated after an attorney made repeated, in-person solici-
tations, attempting to represent two women injured in an automo-
bile accident.72 The appeal resulted from a state bar association de-
termination that the attorney violated the rules of professional 
conduct, and subsequent discipline.73 The attorney claimed that his 
activity was protected under the First Amendment.74 Rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that the attorney's in-person solicitation 
was unprotected commercial speech that could be regulated by the 
State.75 In its rationale, the Court stressed the need for a prophylac-
tic regulation that would protect the public from unscrupulous pro-
fessional conduct and distinguished a public advertisement from in-
person solicitation.76 The former, which is not coercive and leaves 
time for the recipient to act on his or her own, was protected 
under the First Amendment.77 However, because the latter exerted 
pressure on an individual to make a decision without the proper in-
formation and an opportunity to weigh the circumstances, it was 
not protected.78 
71. See id. at 455-56. 
72. See id. at 449-51. 
73. See id. at 454. 
74. See id. The First Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 361 (1927); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 
(1923). 
75. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454. 
76. See id. at 457, 468. Direct, in-person solicitation is also prohibited by the Mary-
land Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in the Maryland Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See MD. RULE 16-812 (2000) (Incorporating Rule 7.3 of the Mary-
land Rules of Professional Conduct, which permits direct contact with pro-
spective clients only when the prospective client: (1) is a close friend, relative, 
etc.; (2) under the auspice of a bona fide charitable legal organization; or (3) 
under the auspice of a bona fide political or similar organization whose mis-
sion includes recommending legal services related to the purpose of the or-
ganization); see also American Bar Ass'n, ANN. MOD. RULES PROF. COND., Rule 
7.3 (1999) (prohibiting direct solicitation of prospective clients). 
77. See id. at 457. 
78. See id. The Court looked at "the immediacy of [the] particular communica-
tion and the imminence of harm [as] factors that made certain communica-
tions less protected than others.» [d. at 457 n.13. (comparing Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (laying the foundation for 
speech acts); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (finding the 
defendant guilty of violating the Espionage Act when he mailed leaflets to 
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In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,79 addressed commercial speech 
protection again, enumerating a four-part test.so In Central Hudson, 
the New York Public Service Commission, the regulatory arm of gov-
ernment for utilities in New York, classified advertising as either 
promotional or informative, then banned promotional advertising.81 
The plaintiffs brought suit alleging the regulation was unconstitu-
tional because it violated their choice to advertise freely under the 
First Amendment.82 However, the Court categorized the speech as 
commercial, which is not afforded absolute protection.83 
The Court found that to regulate commercial speech, the gov-
ernment must "assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restric-
tions on commercial speech."84 In addition, the government must 
demonstrate that the regulation was directly related to its purpose, 
and the regulation must be drawn narrowly.85 To achieve these 
objectives, the Court enumerated a four-part test for commercial 
speech.86 . 
First, the Court asked how valuable the need to advertise was to 
the company.87 In Central Hudson, the corporation monopolized the 
market; therefore, although advertising was always important, this 
factor weighed low in the analysis.88 Second, the Court looked at 
the state's interest.89 Here, it concluded energy conservation was al-
ways important and was a valid state interest.90 Third, the Court fo-
cused "on the relationship between the State's interests and the ad-
vertising ban. "91 The Court concluded this prong was weak because 
men, telling them to dodge the draft». 
79. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
80. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 
(1999), discusses the four parts of the Central Hudson test. It explains that the 
four parts are interrelated and "not entirely discrete." Id. 
81. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-59. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. at 561. 
84. Id. at 564. 
85. See id. at 564-65. The Court is clear that the interest cannot be indirect; it 
must be a direct government interest. See id. 
86. See id. at 566-71. 
87. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-68. 
88. See id. at 567-68. 
89. See id. at 568-69. 
90. See id. 
91. Id. at 569. 
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the link was speculative.92 The final prong was "whether the Com-
mission's complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by 
the First Amendment is no mor:e extensive than necessary to further 
the State's interest in energy conservation."93 Here, the Commis-
sion's regulation failed because, although the State had an impor-
tant interest, it was not sufficient to justify suppressing all 
advertising.94 
These cases are the cornerstone for First Amendment analysis 
of commercial speech. Orahlik redefined the interplay between pro-
tected speech and regulated, unprotected speech.95 Central Hudson 
provided the framework to analyze commercial speech.96 
E. Words Likely to Incite Imminent Lawless Action 
The cases guiding the protection of the First Amendment: 
[H] ave fashioned the principle that the constitutional guar-
antees of free speech and free press do not permit a State 
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action.97 
There is a fine line between mere advocacy protected by the First 
Amendment, and advocacy directed at inciting imminent lawless ac-
tion, which is devoid of First Amendment protection. In order to 
understand the current standard for distinguishing between the two 
types of advocacy, it is important to understand the seminal case of 
this area of speech, Brandenburg v. Ohio.98 
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court declared Ohio's Criminal 
Syndicalism Act unconstitutiona1.99 This statute punished people 
who advocated violent political and industrial reform. 1Oo In that 
92. See id. 
93. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-70. 
94. [d. 
95. See supra notes 7~78 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the test enu-
merated in Central Hudson. 
97. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
98. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
99. See id. at 448. 
100. See id. The Act punishes persons who "advocate or teach the duty, necessity, 
or propriety" of violence "as a means of accomplishing industrial or political 
reform;" or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing 
such advocacy; or who "justify" the commission of violent acts "with intent to 
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case, a newspaper journalist filmed two meetings of the Klu Klux 
Klan (KKK), during which the appellant stated that continued "sup-
pression" of the Caucasian race would lead the Klan to commit acts 
of "revengeance" against the President, Congress, and the Supreme 
Court. 101 Both films revealed KKK members yelling noxious state-
ments about people of Jewish and African-American heritage, stat-
ing that the KKK should deport Jews to Israel and the African-
Americans to Africa.102 These films were used by the State to convict 
the appellant of violating Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act. 103 
The Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional because it vi-
olated the First Amendment. 104 In its analysis, the Court revisited 
Whitney v. California,105 where it upheld a California statute similar to 
the Ohio Act because "'advocating' violent means to effect political 
and economic change involves such danger to the security of the 
State that the State may outlaw it. "106 However, in Brandenburg, the 
Court articulated a new principle that "constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of force or of law violation except where such advo-
cacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action. "107 The Court stressed, "the mere 
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity 
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a 
group for violent action and steeling it to such action. "108 Signifi-
cantly, the Court distinguished the right to assemble and teach 
from the unprotected act of causing imminent danger to the safety 
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndi-
calism;" or who "voluntarily assemble" with a group formed "to teach or advo-
cate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id. 
101. See id. at 446. 
102. See id. at 44647. 
103. See id. at 445. 
104. See id. at 448. The Court stated: 
Accordingly, we are confronted with a statute which, by its own words 
and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on 
pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advo-
cate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the con-
demnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
[d. at 449. 
105. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
106. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
107. [d. (emphasis added). The Court indicated that this principle was the result of 
a past decision that had discredited Whitney. See id. (citing Dennis v. U.S. 341 
U.S. 494, 507 (1951». The Brandenburg Court overruled Whitnry. See id. at 449. 
108. [d. at 448. (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961». 
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of citizens. 109 Any statute that did not distinguish advocacy from in-
citement of imminent lawless action intruded upon First and Four-
teenth Amendment freedoms.lIO 
Applying the law to the facts before it, the Court held the Ohio 
statute unconstitutional because it punished mere advocacy.111 The 
appellant advocated what he believed to be the importance of law-
less action, which the statute forbade. ll2 The First Amendment pro-
tected the appellant's speech because he advocated his. belief of the 
importance of acts of "revenge" and the deportation of Jews and M-
rican-Americans.ll3 However, the Court's rationale indicated that, 
had the appellant made a speech that was directed to incite acts of 
"revenge" and the deportation of Jews and Mrican-Americans, and 
the effect of his speech would have made the occurrence of such acts 
likely, then his speech would not have been protected by the First 
Amendment.1I4 v 
The Brandenburg two-prong test, whereby speech, first, "is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [, and sec-
ond, that it is] ... likely to incite or produce such action,"115 
promulgated a clear test to determine the line between protected 
and unprotected "dangerous" speech under the First Amend-
me~t.116 The test distinguished speech that incites imminent lawless 
action, which was unprotected, from mere advocacy, which retained 
the protection of the First Amendment.ll7 
Following Brandenburg, various courts have assessed what infor-
mation must be provided in order for advocacy to be protected as 
free speech. liS The Supreme Court applied the Brandenburg test in 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.11 9 In Claiborne, the NAACP boy-
cotted ~everal white merchants who disregarded the NAACP's de-
109. See id. at 448-49. 
110. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
111. See id. at 449. 
112. See id. at 448. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 447, 449. 
115. See id. at 447. 
116. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
117. See id.; see also supra notes 107'{)8 and accompanying text. 
118. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text. 
119. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). But see O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong but I am Weak: Why 
the "Imminent Lawl£ss Action" Standard Should Not Apply to Speech that Threatens 
Individuals with Vioi£nce, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 177, 199-203 (2000). "At best the doc-
trinal connection between Claibourne and Brandenburg is tenuous and unfortu-
nate." See id. at 200. 
2000] Rice v. Paladin 221 
mands for racial equality and integration. l20 Charles Evers, a NAACP 
official and boycott organizer, in a public speech, said that blacks 
would be watched and anyone who did not act in accordance with 
the boycott "would be answerable to him."121 In another speech, Ev-
ers said that "boycott violators would be disciplined by their own 
people,"122 and in a third speech said, "[i]f we catch any of you go-
ing into any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn 
neck. "123 
The Court found that Evers speech passed the Brandenburg test, 
and was therefore protected.124 Justice Stevens wrote that, "[i]n the 
passionate atmosphere in which the speeches were delivered, they 
might have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of disci-
pline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence whether 
or not improper discipline was specifically intended. "125 Evers ad-
dress was basically "an impassioned plea" for blacks to unify and 
support each other and to . "realize the political and economic 
power available to them. "126 The Court acknowledged that Evers 
used strong language, and added that a question of Evers' liability 
would have been raised if his speech had been followed by acts of 
violence. 127 
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY IMPOSED FOR SPEECH INSTIGAT-
ING VIOLATIONS OF PENAL LAWS 
Unlike in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., several courts have 
imposed criminal liability for speech-related conduct. 
120. See Claiboume, 458 U.S. at 889. 
121. See id. at 900 n.28, 926. 
122. See id. at 902. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. at 928. 
125. See id. at 927. 
126. See Claibourne, 458 U.S. at 928. "An advocate must be free to stimulate his au-
dience with spontaneous appeals for unity and action in a common cause." 
See id. 
127. See id. The Court added that with the exception of one incident, acts of vio-
lence happened within weeks or months of one of Evers' speeches. See id. The 
Court also pointed out: "If there were other evidence of his authorization of 
wrongful conduct, the references to discipline in the speeches could be used 
to corroborate that evidence." Id. at 929; see also Reed, supra note 119, at 202 
("The opinion emphasized the necessary evidentiary connection between in-
citement and violence within a reasonable time .... "). 
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A. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Coalition of Life Activists 
In Planned Parenthood oj Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Co-
alition oj Life Activists,l28 the plaintiffs ("Providers") sued members of 
the anti-abortion group, American Coalition of Life Activists 
("ACLA"), alleging ACLA issued material comprising threats to 
their safety.129 The appellate court enjoined the defendant from 
publishing and exhibiting materials, including a poster entitled 
"The Deadly Dozen," which listed the names and addresses of doc-
tors who performed abortions and was exhibited at anti-abortion 
rallies. l30 The appellate court found that the speech act of publish-
ing and exhibiting this poster at abortion rallies created a true 
threat to bodily harm of the plaintiffs. l31 In addition, the ACLA had 
various "WANTED" posters and papers collectively referred to as 
the "Nuremburg File," which contained names and addresses of 
doctors who performed abortions.132 The Nuremburg File was also 
posted on the Internet.133 
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed 
outside the Pensacola, Florida office where he performed abortion 
procedures. l34 On August 21, 1993, Dr. George Patterson was also 
shot and killed outside the clinic where he performed abortions.135 
Prior to their murders, the names and addresses of both Drs. Gunn 
and Patterson were listed on an ACLA "WANTED" poster.136 On 
July 29, 1994, Dr. John Byard Britton, the doctor who replaced Dr. 
Gunn, was shot and killed outside his office, along with his escort.137 
Mter extensive findings of fact, the court briefly addressed the 
defendant's contention that the posters and the Nuremburg Files 
were protected speech, "totally reject[ing]" this defenseps Relying 
128. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999), vacated by 2001 WL 293260 (9th Cir. March 
28,2001). 
129. See id. at 1133. The plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief against and dam-
ages from ACtA, as well as other relief. See id. 
130. See id. at 1134. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 1133-34. 
133. See Planned Parenthood, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 1135. 
138. See id. at 1154-55. 
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on the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"),139 the 
court held that the defendant's freedom of speech was fallible. 140 
FACE expressly gave courts the authority to provide injunctive relief 
when a plaintiff faced unlawful threats. 141 Given these threats, the 
court held that each day the above-mentioned material was open 
for public consumption, the plaintiffs' were in physical danger. 142 
While the court acknowledged that a heightened scrutiny was appli-
cable because potentially protected speech was involved, it held that 
this heightened scrutiny was clearly satisfied and that the publica-
tion of such sensitive information was not protected speech.143 
B. United States v. Rowlee 
In United States v. Rowlee,144 the defendants were convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and aid-
ing and assisting others in the filing of false tax documents.145 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
First Amendment protection did not extend to participation in a 
conspiracy to defraud the IRS, and that the trial court correctly in-
structed the jury that the First Amendment afforded no defense 
where the defendants urged preparation and presentation of fraud-
ulent documents, when they knew their advice would be heeded.146 
In 1990, the defendant formed the New York Patriot Society for 
Individual Liberty and Association (the "Society"), and worked as 
the Executive Director.147 The Society dealt exclusively with promot-
ing tax evasion, and advertised its services in the newspaper. 148 
Based on these advertisements, Mr. Rowlee formed classes where he 
instructed members on how to unlawfully evade the Internal Reve-
nue Code.149 After completing his course, the defendant sold pack-
ets to students who had elected to become members of his club 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000). 
140. See Planned Parenthood, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 1155. 
144. 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 828 (1990) (finding no First 
Amendment protection for defendant instructor who sold tax forms to justify 
fraudulent claims and provided tax advice for all of the members on how to 
evade taxes). 
145. See id. at 1276. 
146. See id. at 1276-77. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. at 1276. 
149. See Rowlee, 899 F.2d at 1277. 
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that contained W-4 forms and instructions to complete the form 
and evade taxes.150 Additionally, the defendant acted as a tax advisor 
for almost one hundred of his students, aiding them in filing false 
W-4 statements.151 
The defendant asserted that the First Amendment protected his 
speech, relying on the fact that he had not incited imminent lawless 
action.152 The trial court disagreed and refused to instruct the jury, 
as the defendant requested, that the First Amendment provided a 
defense for his conduct.153 The Second Circuit affirmed this ruling 
in holding that it has rarely been suggested that free speech ex-
tends to violations of a criminal statute.154 Furthermore, the Second 
Circuit elaborated that, even if the defendant's First Amendment 
rights had been somehow abridged, the government's interest in 
maintaining the IRS far outweighed the defendant's rights.155 
C. United States v. Varani 
In United States v. Varani,156 the defendant filed a blank income 
tax return.157 He was contacted by a collection officer for the IRS, 
Mr. Samuel Ginsburg, attempting to collect on Varani's delinquent 
accounts.15S In 1967, the defendant paid his 1965 taxes, however, af-
ter noticing that that the defendant also filed a blank income tax 
return for 1966, Mr. Ginsburg contacted the defendant again and 
asked him to refile and pay his 1966 income taxes.159 Varani became 
belligerent with the collections officer, refused to file the 1966 re-
turn, and threatened to shoot Mr. Ginsburg and any member of the 
IRS if they attempted to seize his property.l60 Despite this threat, Mr. 
Ginsburg again contacted the defendant and arranged a meeting to 
discuss the situation.161 Upon arriving, the defendant again 
threatened Mr. Ginsburg, this time promising to blow his head 
150. See ill. 
151. See id. 
152. See ill. 
153. See ill. at 1277-78. 
154. See id. at 1278 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted». 
155. See Rnwiee, 899 F.2d at 1279 (citations omitted). 
156. 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (" [S]peech is not protected by the First 
Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime itself."). 
157. See id. at 758. 
158. See id. at 759. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See ill. 
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Off.162 Following this meeting, the defendant wrote a long, rambling, 
and violent letter to Mr. Ginsburg in which he again stated that he 
would shoot Mr. Ginsburg if anyone attempted to seize his prop-
erty.163 As a result, the defendant was criminally charged with threat-
ening an officer of the IRS, a violation of federal law. l64 
At trial, the defendant claimed he could not be held criminally 
liable for his threats because of his First Amendment right to free 
speech.165 The court analyzed this defense under United States v. 
Schenck166 and the "clear and present danger test."167 The court held 
that, despite the logic of the defendant's contention, speech was not 
protected when it was the crime itself, and accordingly, the court 
found the defendant guilty.l68 
IV. THE RICE v. PALADIN ENTERPRISES, INC. ROLLER 
COASTER UNNECESSARILY LIMITS FREE SPEECH 
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. 169 resulted after the gruesome 
murder of three victims in Silver Spring, Maryland by James Perry.170 
Perry committed these murders by following instructi0ns provided 
in books entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Con-
tractors ("Hit Man"), and How to Make a Silencer ("Silencers"), both 
published by Paladin Enterprises ("Paladin").171 Family members of 
the victims brought a wrongful death action against Paladin on the 
theory that, by publishing books instructing how to murder for hire, 
Paladin aided and abetted Perry.172 Paladin defended this action 
based on its First Amendment right to publish the books.173 
162. See Varani, 435 F.2d at 759. 
163. See id. at 760. 
164. See 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) (1964). 
165. See Varani, 435 F.2d at 761. 
166. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
167. See Varani, 435 F.2d at 761. 
168. See id. at 762. 
169. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, Rice v. Paladin 
Enters., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
170. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 242; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. 
171. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241 n.2; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. As their titles sugge~t, 
these books chronicle how to carry out a murder for hire, and how to create 
a tool to silence the noise that emanates from a bullet exiting a gun. See Rice, 
940 F. Supp. at 838. 
172. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. 
173. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. 
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A. Initial Analysis of Rice: the Brandenburg Application Results in 
Publisher Protection 
The Federal District Court of Maryland identified the five areas 
of speech that receive limited or no First Amendment protection,t74 
and determined that Hit Man could be categorized as speech incit-
ing imminent, lawless activity under Brandenburg, affording limited 
First Amendment protection.175 First, the form of speech involved 
advocating or instructing lawless activity.176 Second, the Brandenburg 
standard applies to speech in all contexts, not just political 
speech.177 
Under the Brandenburg test, to justify restricting speech "be-
cause it was an incitement to lawless action, the court must be satis-
fied that the speech (1) was directed or intended toward the goal of 
producing imminent lawless conduct and (2) was likely to produce 
such imminent conduct."178 In the present case, Paladin conceded 
that their books were intended to produce criminal activity.179 How-
ever, to impose liability on Paladin, the speech must be unprotected 
and the publisher must have intended imminent lawless activity to 
result, necessitating Paladin to intend for Perry to murder the vic-
tims immediately upon reading the book.180 This did not occur.181 
The families of the victims argued that, even if Brandenburg 
does apply, they should still prevail,182 arguing that "the three com-
ponents of the Brandenburg test have been met: 1) intent, 2) immi-
nence, and 3) likelihood."183 The court rejected this argument for 
174. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841. See supra Part II (enumerating the areas of speech 
afforded limited First Amendment protection). 
175. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841, 84445. Brandenburg v. Ohio prohibits the govern-
ment from forbidding "advocacy of the use of force or of law violation" un-
less "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and is likely to incite or produce such action." [d. at 841. See supra notes 
97-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the free speech test enunci-
ated in Brandenburg. 
176. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841. 
177. See id. The court analogized the facts sub judice to cases in which the Branden-
burg doctrine was applied whereby physical injury or death resulted allegedly 
from viewing violent movies and television shows. See id. 
178. [d. at 846. 
179. See id. at 847. 
180. See id. 
181. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847. The parties stipulated that Perry committed the 
murders one year after receiving the books. See id. 
182. See id. 
183. [d. 
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several reasons: first, the intent to which Paladin conceded is irrele-
vant to the analysis; second, as stated previously, there was no evi-
dence that Paladin intended immediate, lawless activity; third, al-
though repugnant, the book "does not constitute incitement or 'a 
call to action.' "184 
Elaborating, the court described the book as advocating, or 
teaching in an abstract manner, rather than inciting. ISS It found that 
the book did not cross the line between permissibly advocating vio-
lence and impermissibly inciting a crime.186 The book did not pur-
port to command anyone to any action immediately, nor did it tend 
to incite violence.187 Finally, the court found that the books did not 
constitute incitement to imminent, lawless activity because the con-
tent in Hit Man and Silenccis was voluminous; the "deadly informa-
tion . . . presumably take [s] time to read." 188 
In its holding, the court stated that "First Amendment protec-
tion is not eliminated simply because the publication of an idea cre-
ates a potential hazard. "189 In a free society, it is unacceptable "to 
limit and restrict creativity in order to avoid dissemination of ideas 
in artistic speech which may adversely affect emotionally and troub-
led individuals. "190 Concluding that Paladin was permitted to raise 
the First Amendment as a defense in this action, the court granted 
its summary judgment motion. 191 
B. The Fourth Circuit Reverses, Expanding States' Rights and Limiting 
First Amendment Protection 
The facts and issue considered on appeal by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were identical to those con-
sidered by the district court: whether the "First Amendment abso-
lutely bars the imposition of liability upon a publisher for assisting 
184. [d. (quoting Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp 199, 204 
(S.D. Fla. 1979) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,322 (1957»). 
185. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847. 
186. See id. 
187. See id. at 847-48. Over 13,000 copies of the book had been sold, and one per-
son actually used the information over the ten years that the book has been 
printed. See id. at 848. In addition, the disclaimers in the advertisement and 
on the book itself stating that the book was for informational purposes only 
did not "indicate a tendency to incite violence." [d. 
188. See id. at 848. 
189. [d. (citing Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 824 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987». 
190. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848. 
191. See id. at 849. 
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in the commISSIon of criminal acts." 192 As in the district court pro-
ceeding, the publisher, Paladin Enterprises, stipulated to facts that 
establish civil liability as a matter of law for aiding and abetting 
James Perry, the defendant convicted of the murders in the under-
lying criminal case, unless it is afforded First Amendment 
protection. 193 
However, after a much more conservative analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the lower court, stating: 
[L] ong-established case law provides that speech-even 
speech by the press-that constitutes criminal aiding and 
abetting does not enjoy the protection of the First Amend-
ment, and . . . we hold . . . that the First Amendment does 
not pose a bar to a finding that Paladin is civilly liable as an 
aider and abetter of Perry's triple contract murder.194 
In reaching this conclusion, the court first recognized the hold-
ing of Brandenburg v. Ohio: 195 "abstract advocacy of lawlessness is pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment,"196 and such a right is 
"one of the ultimate safeguards of liberty."197 
The court then countered Brandenburg's application to the case 
sub judice by enumerating cases denying First Amendment protec-
tion to defendants criminally charged with aiding and abetting the 
violation of a criminal statute as a result of their speech act;198 "it is 
equally well established that speech which . . . is tantamount to le-
gitimately proscribable, nonexpressive conduct may itself be legiti-
192. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997). All other issues of 
law and fact were reserved for subsequent proceedings. See id. See supra notes 
169-73 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the facts of Rice at 
both the district and appellate court levels; see also supra notes 179-81, 184-88 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts and issue of Rice in the 
district court proceeding. 
193. See id. Paladin stipulated that: Perry followed the directions in the Hit Man 
and Silencers books, both how-to manuals to commit crimes published by Pala-
din Enterprises; in marketing Hit Man, Paladin intended to attract and assist 
criminals and aspiring criminals who desire information on how to commit 
crimes; it intended and had knowledge that Hit Man would be used upon re-
ceipt by criminals to plan and execute murder for hire; and that, by publish-
ing and selling Hit Man, it assisted Perry in the murders. See id. 
194. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1997). 
195. 395 U.S. 44 (1969). 
196. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. at 243-46. 
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mately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the consti-
tutional enforcement of generally acceptable statutes. "199 The court 
elaborated: "it rarely has been suggested that the constitutional 
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or 
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid 
criminal statute. "200 
As further support, the Fourth Circuit enumerated court opin-
ions considering whether the speech-act doctrine should be applied 
to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting the underlying crimi-
nal offense, stating that every court considering the issue held that 
the First Amendment is not an absolute defense, per se, even when 
the aiding and abetting is in the form of speech.201 
Further, the Fourth Circuit analogized the cases previously dis-
cussed, whereby no First Amendment protection was afforded to 
criminal defendants charged with aiding and abetting a crime as a 
result of a speech act, to the civil action before the court.202 In do-
ing so, it relied on a Congressional Report concerning the availabil-
ity of bom1:rmaking information prepared by the Department of Jus-
tice, stating: 
[T]he law is now well established that the First Amend-
ment, and Brandenburg's "imminence" requirement in par-
ticular, generally poses litde obstacle to the punishment of 
speech that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting, be-
cause "culpability in such cases is premised, not on defend-
ants' 'advocacy' of criminal conduct, but on defendants' 
199. [d. at 243 (quoting Cohen v. Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) ("noting 'well-
established line of decisions holding that generally applicable law do not of-
fend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effects of its ability to gather and report the news'"». 
200. [d. (quoting Gibony v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) 
(additional citations omitted in original». 
201. See id. at 24446. The court referred to the following cases: United States v. 
Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990) (failing to recognize Branden-
burg as a defense to a conviction for conspiring to transport and aid and abet 
gambling equipment across state lines); United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 
549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1985) (sustaining convictions for criminal liability for 
counseling tax evasion); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(disallowing First Amendment protection for publishing and distributing in-
structions on manufacturing illegal drugs charged with aiding and abetting 
under a criminal statute). See id. at 24445. The court also enumerated several 
cases holding the First Amendment inapplicable to criminal charges of aiding 
and abetting violations of tax laws. See id. at 245-46. 
202. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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successful efforts to assist others by detailing to them the 
means of accomplishing the crimes. "203 
To make this connection, the court stated: 
[W]hile there is considerably less authority on the subject, 
we assume that those speech acts, which the government 
may criminally prosecute with little or no concern for the 
First Amendment, the government may likewise subject to 
civil penalty or make subject to private causes of action. 
Even if this is not universally so, we believe it must be true 
at least where the government's interest in preventing the 
particular conduct at issue is uncontrovertibly compelling.204 
The court qualified this newly enunciated rule in two ways.20S 
First, when a publisher only could foresee the possible misuse of in-
formation for impermissible purposes, then the First Amendment 
may "stand as a bar to the imposition of liability .... "206 This quali-
fication would strike a balance between protecting the chilling ef-
fect of innocent, lawfully useful speech and holding accountable 
those who would "intentionally assist and encourage crime and then 
shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First 
Amendment. "207 
The second qualification is that the First Amendment might 
limit a state's power to create and enforce a cause of action that 
would permit imposing civil liability for speech constituting pure ab-
stract advocacy not satisfying the Brandenburg test.20S 
The court stated that, because states are authorized to regulate 
speech under a criminal statute, they are empowered to regulate 
203. See id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF 
BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CON· 
TROLLED BY FEDERAL LAw, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAy 
BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, April, 1997, at 37, available at <http:/ / 
www.derechos.org/human-rights/speech/bomb.html#pubavail»; see also supra 
notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Department of Justice Re-
port). 
204. Rice, 128 F.3d at 24647. 
205. See id. at 247. Both qualifications were inapplicable to the case at bar. See id. 
206. [d. 
207. [d. at 24748. 
208. [d. at 248-49. Speech that is "not 'directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action ... [nor] likely to incite or produce such action' " does not 
meet the Brandenburg test. [d. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969». 
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speech under a civil claim for aiding and abetting a crime.209 As a 
result, the court held that the First Amendment did not bar the 
plaintiffs' action and the facts of the case would support a finding 
that Paladin was civilly liable for aiding and abetting James Perry in 
the murders of Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, and Janice Saunders.210 
v. HAD BRANDENBURG BEEN CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE 
RICE COURTS, NO FURTHER LIMITATIONS OF PUBLISHER'S 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH WAS NECESSARY 
The federal district court correctly determined that Brandenlmrg 
applied to Paladin Press's publication of the murder for hire in-
struction manual, Hit Man. 211 However, the district court incorrectly 
applied the facts of Rice to Brandenlmrg,212 resulting in an erroneous 
decision. Further complicating the case, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the correct conclusion, but 
improperly analyzed Rice v. Paladin Enterprises under the Brandenlmrg 
test, and instead expanded States' ability to circumscribe speech.213 
Although the result was the same as it would have been had the dis-
trict court correctly analyzed the facts of the case under Branden-
lmrg,214 the Fourth Circuit was overreaching and unsettled over 
thirty years of precedent. 
A. The Correct Rule Misapplied: The District Court's Approach 
For over thirty years, the Brandenlmrg test has been applied to 
determine whether free speech protected under the First Amend-
ment should be limited because the nature of the speech is likely to 
cause imminent, lawless activity.215 This test was applied by the Fed-
209. Rice, 128 F.3d at 250. 
210. See id. at 243, 250, 265. 
211. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal 
district court's analysis of the correct law under which to analyze Rice v. Pala-
din Enterprises. 
212. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal 
district court's analysis of the facts of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises under the Bran-
denlmrg test. 
213. See supra notes 204, 209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ratio-
nale and holding of the Fourth Circuit's review of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises on 
appeal. 
214. Compare supra note 210 and accompanying text (stating the court of appeals 
holding in Rice v. Paladin) with Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 250 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (discussing the case within the context of the rule announced in 
Brandenlmrg) . 
215. See supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenlmrg 
232 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
eral District Court for the District of Maryland in Rice v. Paladin En-
terprises when it determined whether the defendant, invoking First 
Amendment protection for crimes resulting from its publication of 
a murder for hire manual, should be granted summary judgment.216 
To determine whether the publisher should be afforded limited 
First Amendment protection, the district court reviewed each of the 
unprotected areas of speech217 and, after negating the others, deter-
mined that "the only category of unprotected speech which Hit 
Man could conceivably be placed is incitement to imminent, lawless 
activity under Brandenburg. "218 When explaining this determination, 
the court stated that the Brandenburg standard was appropriate be-
cause it "involves speech which advocates or teaches lawless activity, 
in this case murder, "219 and that the standard was not limited to po-
litical speech.220 The court then analogized the facts of the present 
case to those in a series of "copy-cat" cases in which the Brandenburg 
standard was applied because they, like Hit Man, "considered depic-
tions of violence alleged to have been imitated. "221 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
216. Rice v. Paladin Enters., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Md. 1996). The plaintiffs 
brought wrongful death and survival actions against the defendant on the the-
ory that, by publishing a book on how to . murder for hire, the defendant 
aided and abetted the murderer in committing the crime. See id. See al~o 
supra notes 169-73, 175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of 
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises and supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the district court's application of the Brandenlntrg test. 
217. For a discussion of the other areas of speech afforded limited or no protec-
tion see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (enumerating the types of 
unprotected speech), notes 36-45 and accompanying text (obscenity), notes 
46-51 and accompanying text (fighting words), notes 52-66 and accompanying 
text (libel), notes 67-94 and accompanying text (commercial speech), and 
notes 97-127 and accompanying text. 
218. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841. See also supra 175-88 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of how the district court applied Brandenlntrg to Rice v. Paladin En-
ters. 
219. Id. at 845. 
220. Id. at 846. 
221. Id. at 846-47 (citing Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 
1987) (reversing the jury's damage award against magazine publisher for 
wrongful death of adolescent who died from alleged autoerotic asphyxia after 
reading article describing the same); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. 
Fla. 1979) (alleging commission of criminal acts as a result of violent pro-
gramming); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988) (suing record 
company for Ozzy Ozboume record that included song "Suicide Solution"); 
Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (raping of girl with bottle by 
teenaged girls imitating similar incident depicted on television drama, Born 
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Once determining the legal standard under which to review the 
case, the court then examined the facts of the case and determined 
that Hit Man did not constitute incitement to imminent lawless ac-
tion, and therefore the publication did not fit into a category of 
speech with limited protection under the First Amendment.222 The 
court reached this determination because, in order to show speech 
was an incitement to lawless action, the speech must be "directed or 
intended toward the goal of producing imminent lawless conduct 
and ... was likely to produce such imminent conduct. "223 The court 
held that although the defendant conceded to intending for its 
books to be "purchased and actually used by criminals, [it has] not 
conceded to the requisite intent, "224 imminent lawless action.225 
The district court interprets imminent, lawless action as imme-
diate.226 However, the interpretation of "immediate" should depend 
on the facts of the case. Paladin intended to for its book to be used 
by criminals to carry out murders for hire.227 However, given the ex-
tent of the speech and the intricacies of the crime encouraged, the 
definition of immediate must be expanded to contemplate the crim-
inal's reading of the book, and preparation of the crime. "Nothing 
in this book says, 'go out and commit murder now!' "228 However, 
that is not required under Brandenburg; the detailed instructions 
provided in Hit Man teach the preparation of the concrete action 
of the highest form of violence prohibited under Brandenburg. 229 
Innocent); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 
1989) (gang-killing of boy after perpetrators viewed the film The Warriors, 
which depicted scenes of gang violence); DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036, 
1040 (R.I. 1982) (imitating a hanging stunt seen on Johnny Carson, a minor 
child killed himself resulting in parents wrongful death action against NBC). 
"Copy cat" cases are those in which a violent act resulted from the perpetra-
tor viewing or otherwise perceiving the act through a form of publication 
(such as a movie, song, book, or the like). See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846. 
222. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847-48. 
223. [d. at 846 (citing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (1988) (citing 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973»). 
224. [d. at 847. 
225. [d. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847. 
229. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (1997) (citing Scales v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 203, 233, 235 (1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 
(1969) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961»; Yates v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 298,320 (1957». 
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B. The Fourth Circuit Reaches the Correct Result, But Without the Rule 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reached the appropriate result, holding that a trier of fact could 
find the requisite intent under Brandenburg to limit Paladin's First 
Amendment right to free speech.230 However, it did not reach this 
conclusion under an analysis of the test created in Brandenburg.231 
The Brandenburg test was carefully created by the Supreme 
Court to ensure that its limitation on speech was narrowly crafted.232 
By failing to use this test, the Fourth Circuit created another excep-
tion to free speech, and enlarged states' authority to regulate 
speech using civil remedies so long as the speech is associated with 
a criminal act that the state may prosecute.233 This was unnecessary 
because the same conclusion could have been reached under the 
appropriate Brandenburg test.234 
Given the sanctity associated with free speech and the First 
Amendment in the United States,235 the Fourth Circuit's analysis was 
inappropriate. The probable outcome is increased liability, which 
would, effectively, result in prior restraint on publishers afraid to 
print material because of the likelihood of defending a civil suit.236 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Freedom of speech has been paramount to our country's iden-
230. See generaUy Rice, 128 F.3d at 249 (stating the court's holding); supra notes 204, 
209 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale and holding of 
the Fourth Circuit's review of Rice v. Paladin Enters. on appeal. 
231. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 249. 
232. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
233. Rice, 128 F.3d at 24647. 
234. See supra Part V.A for a discussion of why the Brandenburg test was appropriate 
under the facts of Rice v. Paldin Enterprises and how the outcome under Bran-
denburg would afford Paladin limited First Amendment protection. 
235. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the high re-
gard for freedom of speech in American society. 
236. See Near v. State of Minnesota ex TeL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712 (1931) (explain-
ing that a primary purpose of free press is to prevent previous restraints upon 
publication); Chaplin sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942) (not-
ing that free press extends beyond freedom from prior restraint). Prior re-
straints "are the most serious and least tolerable infringements on First 
Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
Additionally, "[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions af-
ter publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." 
Id. (citing A. Bickel, THE MoRALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975). 
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tity and formation. 237 Since the ratification of the First Amendment 
in the Bill of Rights, only a handful of limitations have been im-
posed on the right to free speech and free press.238 However, this 
tradition was undercut by the Fourth Circuit in Rice v. Paladin Enter-
prises.239 In Rice, the Fourth Circuit failed to apply the appropriate 
Brandenburg test, despite the likelihood that the outcome would 
have been identicaJ.240 By creating a new standard of review,241 the 
court encroached upon a tradition to which writers, publishers and 
Americans are and have been entitled to for the past thirty years.242 
The potential liability imposed on Paladin Enterprises for printing 
its murder for hire manuaP43 likely and inappropriately sends a 
wave of concern among publishers nationwide about potential liabil-
ity resulting from the words they print. 
Elise M. Balkin 
137. See supra notes 15, 26-29 and accompanying text discussing the importance of 
the free exchange of ideas on American history. 
238. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text enumerating the limitations on 
the right to free speech. 
139. See supra Part N for a discussion of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. 
240. See supra Part N.B for an analysis of the district and appellate court holdings 
in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. 
241. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text for the standard of review cre-
ated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rice v. 
Paladin Enterprises. . 
242. See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
243. See supra Part N for a discussion of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises. 
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